

Revealing the Possibility of Relating Philosophy and Theology: Heidegger's Early Exploration of Sin

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Abstract

Heidegger never published anything with regard to the theme of sin, which is an important issue for Christian theology. Nevertheless, he gave a two-part talk “The Problem of Sin in Luther” (1924) in Rudolf Bultmann’s theology seminar on St. Paul’s ethics. In that talk, Heidegger presents some basic ideas about Luther’s conception of sin. On the other hand, Heidegger

投稿日期：2023.11.13；接受刊登日期：2024.1.11

責任校對：向富緯、王尚

DOI: 10.30393/TNCUP.202407_(52).0001

analyzes, in his SS 1921 lecture course “Augustine and Neo-Platonism”, how St. Augustine exhibits the phenomenon of temptation in *Confessions* Book X, which is relevant to the theme of sin.

The aim of this paper is not at presenting how Heidegger interprets Luther and St. Augustine concerning the theme of sin. Rather, by examining Heidegger’s reading of Luther and St. Augustine, we can discover how the understanding of temptation can be put together with, or even can be connected and contribute to the understanding of sin. This discovery, with further implication, indicates that philosophy can be related to theology, despite Heidegger’s firmly dissociating these two, claiming that they are mortal enemies.

The first part of this paper exhibits Heidegger’s reading of Luther on the theme of sin. He indicates that Luther considers sin as turning away from God, perverting the relation between man and God, and claiming oneself to be God and God not to be God. The second part of this paper deals with Heidegger’s interpretation with respect to St. Augustine’s presentation of three forms of temptation: desire of the flesh (*concupiscentia carnis*), desire of the eyes (*concupiscentia oculorum*) and secular ambition (*ambitio saeculi*). The last part of this paper reflects on how the three forms of temptation results in sinning. This reflection gives a hint at the possibility of relating philosophy and theology.

Keywords: Heidegger, Luther, Augustine, sin, temptation, philosophy and theology

Revealing the Possibility of Relating Philosophy and Theology: Heidegger's Early Exploration of Sin*

Heidegger himself confesses, “Without this theological background I should never have come upon the path of thinking.” (Heidegger 1982: 10) His early works testify to a strong influence of Christian theological thought. The theological aspects of Heidegger's thought have provoked debate among scholars. This debate revolves around one main question: how to conceive of the relation between philosophy and theology? In his 1927/28 lecture “Phenomenology and Theology”, Heidegger proposes the theological concept of sin as an illustrative example to this issue (Heidegger 2009b: 51-52). Thus, from Heidegger's discussion on the theme of sin, we may discover a hint about the possibility to relate philosophy and theology.

Sin is one of the most important issues of Christian theology. However, Heidegger never published anything specifically about it. All we have is a

* This paper is based on part of my doctoral dissertation *Being-guilty and Sin: A Case Study regarding the Relation between Philosophy and Theology according to the Early Heidegger* (Hung 2020). I presented a draft of this paper at the 3rd International Conference of Heidegger Circle in Asia (HCIA) at National Chengchi University (NCCU) in Taipei on October 4, 2023. The title of my presentation was “From Being-tempted to Being-sinful: Early Heidegger on the Theme of Sin”. Thanks to the comments of participants, I refined my draft and resulted in this paper. I especially thank Choong-Su Han, Federico José Lagdameo and Yohei Kageyama.

student transcript of his two-part talk in Rudolf Bultmann's theology seminar on St. Paul's ethics.¹ The topic of this talk was "The Problem of Sin in Luther" (Heidegger 2002). Another source relevant to the theme of sin is Heidegger's lecture course "Augustine and Neo-Platonism" in 1921 summer semester, where he examines St. Augustine's discussion on temptation in *Confessions* Book X (Heidegger 2004a: 155-184). Chronologically speaking, Heidegger's lecture course about Augustine on temptation (1921) took place before his talk of Luther on sin (1924). And without much doubt Augustine's insight influences Luther's theology, and they both affect Heidegger's thought. But my attempt is to reveal the possibility of relating philosophy and theology, and since this attempt is inspired by Heidegger's proposal of theological concept of sin as an illustrative example, I will deal with the concept of sin first, and then with the issue of temptation. Hence, this paper consists in three parts: Firstly, I will exhibit Heidegger's reading of Luther on the theme of sin. In the second part, I will discuss how Heidegger interprets St. Augustine's presentation on temptation. And finally, on the basis of these two, I will indicate a possibility of relating philosophy and theology through reflecting on the transition from being-tempted to being-sinful.

I. Heidegger's Reading of Luther's Theological Thinking on the Theme of Sin

Before discussing Heidegger's reading of Luther on sin, there are two key points to clarify in advance. Firstly, as Heidegger points out, "Luther does not see sin as the accumulation of errors." (Heidegger 2002: 106) The

¹ This seminar was held in the 1923-24 winter semester. Heidegger delivered his talk on 14 and 21 February.

problem of sin is not concerned with the issue of ethics or the value of human action, but is a genuine theological problem that deals with a human being's relation to God. Secondly, Heidegger holds that Luther's view on sin is not concerned with specific sins, but rather with sin as such, pointing to the human being's corruption. This section will focus on the concept of sin as such, based on Heidegger's reading of Luther's concept of it.

A. Heidegger's General Comments on Theological Investigation of Sin

At the beginning of the talk in Bultmann's seminar, Heidegger clarifies the theme of theology: "The theme of theology is man in the how of his being-placed [*Wie seines Gestelltseins*] before God." (Heidegger 2002: 105) The term "*Gestelltsein*", as Brian Hansford Bowles interestingly indicates, is later related by Heidegger (SS 1924) to the Greek *διάθεσις* (disposition) and translated as *Befindlichkeit*, "the at first non-psychological state of always already finding oneself in the world".² After proposing "the how of the being-placed (*Wie des Gestelltseins*) before God" as the theme of theology, Heidegger immediately broadens the scope of research: "But the being of man [*das Sein des Menschen*] is at the same time also a being in the world [*ein Sein in der Welt*], and there exists for him also the whole problem of the world." (Heidegger 2002: 105) Now the theme of theology for Heidegger concerns not merely the "how of being-placed before God" (*Wie des Gestelltseins vor Gott*), but rather the being of man as being-in-the-world, to use the term Heidegger coins in *Being and*

² See Brian Hansford Bowles' brief introduction to "The Problem of Sin in Luther", and also the editor's note on page 481. See Heidegger 2007: 188, 481.

Time. Heidegger thus thinks that the theme of theology is about the being of man as such,³ specifically on the “how of being-placed before God” (*Wie des Gestelltseins vor Gott*).

If the theme of theology is the “how of being-placed before God” (*Wie des Gestelltseins vor Gott*), then the meaning of sin must be sought from this regard. Theology must investigate into the status of man’s standing before God, i.e. the relation of man to God seen from the perspective of *iustitia originalis* (original righteousness). “What is asked about [*gefragt*] here is the being of man [*das Sein des Menschen*] at the moment he emerged from the hand of God.” (Heidegger 2002: 105) By asserting this, Heidegger orients the questioning concerning man’s original righteousness to the questioning about the being of man at the moment of creation. The theological questioning of the meaning of sin is related to the questioning of man’s original righteousness, which in turn has to do with the questioning of the (primordial, creational) being of man. Insofar as the questioning of the meaning of sin is related to the being of man, the problem of sin concerns the real core (essence) of man.

Furthermore, the being of man must be so constituted that, at the one hand, man must be “regarded as the *summum bonum*” in accordance with the story of creation, but on the other hand “the Fall and the being of sin [*Sein der Sünde*] are possible and are not a burden falling on God” (Heidegger 2002: 105). Heidegger in his course “Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity” in 1923 summer semester says something very similar. First of all, he confirms that “Being-fallen, being-sinful [*Gefallen, Sündigsein*] is not a state derived from God, but rather one into which man

³ Cf. Heidegger’s expression of “the humanity of the human being” (*die Menschheit des Mensch*) in his 1946 treatise: Heidegger 2009a: 261.

has brought himself” (Heidegger 2008: 23). That is to say, sin may never be represented as something from God as Creator. Thus, the (primordial) being of man, at the moment of creation, must be considered as good, i.e. as being in a state of righteousness, or, being in a state of *integrity*. Yet the constitution of this primordial being of man is such that “the possibility of falling is co-given” (Heidegger 2008: 23) at the moment of creation.

Heidegger further indicates that Luther, when speaking of sin, draws attention to *affectus* (affect), which Heidegger understands as “the mode of man’s being-placed in relation to things” (*die Weise des Gestelltseins des Menschen zu den Dingen*) (Heidegger 2002: 106). Sin has to do with this *affectus* and thus is “something defined by a very particular kind of being-placed in relation to the world [*Gestelltsein zur Welt*]” (Heidegger 2002: 106), a specific mode of being in the world. This specific mode of being in the world arises from man’s self-deceiving clinging to things of the world and results in horror, a non-psychological state of mood in being-displaced by (*Entsetzsein vor*) things, which in turn brings spiritual despair (*desperatio spiritualis*). Sin (being sinful) is a specific mode of being in the world which is characterized as “persisting in the world that affords not glories but adversities” (Heidegger 2002: 106).

B. Three Characteristics of Sin

In the talk Heidegger gave in Bultmann’s seminar, he highlights several essential points with regard to the problem of sin. First of all, he points out, that “[i]n Luther, sin is a concept of existence” (Heidegger 2002: 108). In other words, sin is a concept that marks man’s existence in a peculiar way, as a factual kind of existence that is “defined by a very particular kind of being-placed [*Gestelltsein*]” (Heidegger 2002: 106). The kind of existence that Heidegger brings to the fore is marked by faith. With

regard to faith, Heidegger in his 1927/28 lecture “Phenomenology and Theology” reaffirms: “The essence of faith can formally be sketched as a way of existence of human Dasein.” (Heidegger 2009b: 43) Faith is a mode of existence, i.e. Christian believing existence, which means “standing (being placed) before God” (Heidegger 2002: 108). Therefore, insofar as “[s]in is nothing other than the antithesis to faith” (Heidegger 2002: 108), sin as “a mode of the being of man” (*Weise des Seins des Menschen*) (Heidegger 2002: 108) is the kind of existence that in standing before God, turns away from God. As Heidegger remarks, “The real sin is *incredulitas*, i.e., unbelief, *aversio dei* [turning away from God].” (Heidegger 2002: 108) As a concept of existence, ‘sin’ has the meaning which is to be understood in an antithetical relation to faith. ‘Sin’ can only be understood in the context of faith, of which theology represents the scientific understanding. Without faith, respectively theology, there is no point in speaking of sin as something essentially different from fault or error.

Secondly, Heidegger notes that sin concerns the perverted relation of man to God. The relation between man and God is that between creature and creator and, as such, amounts to a relation of worship. It is man who should worship God, not the other way around. Sin is the reversal of this relation. Heidegger quotes Luther’s *Disputatio contra scholasticam theologiam* thesis 17, where the latter argues that “Man cannot of himself want God to be God; rather, man wants to be God. And this is precisely the essence of sin: *velle se esse deum et deum non esse deum* [to want himself to be God and God not to be God].” (Heidegger 2002: 106) On the other hand, as Heidegger remarks on Luther’s lectures on Genesis from 1544, “the being of God [*das Sein Gottes*] is always conceived of as *verbum* [word], and the fundamental relation of man to God is *audire* [hearing].” (Heidegger 2002: 110) Man should hear God’s Word. But this relation was

broken after Adam and Eve succumbed to the serpent's temptation. The sin of Adam and Eve thus consists, as Heidegger remarks, "in the fact that they lend an ear to a Word that is not God's Word" (Heidegger 2002: 109).

Thirdly, as Heidegger mentions, there is a tendency in Luther's theology that sin is something that must be amplified: "Thus Luther puts the emphasis on the *affectus subtilissime carnalis* [simplest affect of the flesh] and arrives at a proposition quite the reverse of Scholasticism: *corruptio amplificanda est* [corruption is something to be amplified]." (Heidegger 2002: 106) The term 'amplify' here is not to be understood in the extensive sense of the manifoldness of sin, but rather in the intensive sense of degree concerning the self-awareness of how serious it is to be under the dominance of sin. This tendency can also be seen in Heidegger's remarks on Luther's lectures on Genesis from 1544:

But we recognize its [i.e. the loss which arises from sin] entire magnitude only when from a correlative point of view we see God as God. For only then do we understand what *aversio Dei*, turning away [from God], means. (Heidegger 2002: 108)

Only when we see God as no less than our Creator can we understand properly the meaning of sin. Sin is not only a mode of being of human beings; rather, sin concerns human being's real essence. As Heidegger clearly remarks, "Thus sin is not an affixing of moral attributes to man but rather his real core." (Heidegger 2002: 108) Sin damages the whole nature of man so that "[t]he *natura hominis* is *corrupta* [corrupt]" (Heidegger 2002: 108) and "[t]he being of man [*das Sein des Menschen*] as such is itself sin" (Heidegger 2002: 108).

C. The Movement of Sin

As stated above, Luther provides a fundamental definition of man

saying that “the being of man [*das Sein des Menschen*] as such is itself sin.” (Heidegger 2002: 108) Furthermore, he sketches the movement of sin in four steps. Based on the story of the Fall in *Genesis*, Heidegger (Heidegger 2002: 108-109) presents Luther’s explanation of the movement of sin in his lectures on *Genesis* from 1544. As Adam and Eve succumbed to the serpent’s temptation and violated God’s dictation, they fell “from faith into unbelief and disobedience” (Heidegger 2002: 109). Their conscience was convicted, and they were frightened. They were so terrified that as they heard the sound of the Lord walking in Paradise, they could do nothing but hide among the trees from the face of the Lord. Heidegger comments, “God is unbearable to man; man is frightened by Him even in the quiet rustling of leaves, since he is shaken and unsettled in his own proper being [*in seinem eigentlichen Sein*].” (Heidegger 2002: 109) As being-frightened, man flees from God, and he flees “in such a way that he constantly wishes to distance himself further, he *fugit in aeternum* [keeps on fleeing forever]” (Heidegger 2002: 109).

In addition to the falling into unbelief and disobedience, being-frightened and fleeing, sin also brings about the making of excuses. After Adam committed sin, he made an excuse to seek relief from sin by saying, “The woman whom you gave to be with me, she gave me fruit from the tree, and I ate.”⁴ In making excuse, man transfers his guilt from himself to the Creator. By accusing God, man seeks to excuse himself. For Heidegger, “That is the real despair.” (Heidegger 2002: 109) But it does not stop here. In her excuse, Eve, on her turn, accuses God as He is the Creator of the serpent. This amounts as the last step of sin: characterizing God as “*auctor peccati* [the originator of sin]” (Heidegger 2002: 109).

⁴ Gen. 3:12 NRS.

These characteristics of sin are expressing a movement from falling into disobedience, to being-frightened and fleeing, then to making excuse, and to accusing God. This movement is heaping sin upon sin, turning unbelief into blasphemy. The last step is rejecting God as *auctor peccati*, in the sense that man says: “God is not God.”(Heidegger 2002: 109)

II. Heidegger’s Understanding of St. Augustine’s *Confessions* Book X on ‘Temptation’

After exhibiting Heidegger’s reading of Luther on sin, we now turn to his interpretation of St. Augustine’s presentation on three different temptations in *Confessions* Book X. Unlike the common (logical) use of the term ‘kind’ to classify various things, Heidegger uses the terms ‘form’ and ‘direction’ to differentiate and qualify these temptations. While the term ‘kind’ refers to the ‘what’, the content of things, the terms ‘form’ and ‘direction’ suggest the ‘how’ of the working of things, i.e. how things are in the working and how things proceed. Heidegger’s use of these terms indicates his emphasis on the ‘how’: the mode of how a temptation reveals itself in the enactment of human life, and how a temptation orients it. Heidegger also views temptation as *defluere* (defluxion, which involves the orientation of life) or danger, which intimates a possibility of falling and suggests a renouncement of the psychological understanding of temptation.⁵

⁵ On the one hand, in the psychological understanding of temptation, the saying “I am more tempted by this than by that” is meaningful. On the other hand, in the non-psychological, say ontological, understanding of temptation, there is no sense using “more” to describe the status of being-tempted. Unless the “more” signifies the comparative degree of being, as Choong-Su Han indicates Heidegger’s usage in “The Origin of the Work of Art”. See (Heidegger 1993: 170, 178, 181). See Han 2023.

The three different forms of temptations St. Augustine talks about explicitly are *concupiscentia carnis*, *concupiscentia oculorum*, and *ambitio saeculi*, which Heidegger considers as “three directions of the *defluere*, of the possibility of defluxion and the danger” (Heidegger 2004a: 156). According to Heidegger, a proper understanding of temptation can be achieved by trying “to encounter it, and to emphasize and seize it authentically in an enactmental [*vollzugsmäßig*] manner” (Heidegger 2004a: 156).

A. The First Form of Tentatio: Concupiscentia Carnis

The first form of temptation is *concupiscentia carnis*, desire of the flesh, which, as the term itself already indicates, concerns the body, or more precisely the bodily senses: touching (somato-sensation), tasting (gustation), smelling (olfaction), hearing (audition) and seeing (vision, sight). With regard to the somato-sensation, St. Augustine talks about sensual lust. Heidegger directs our attention to the methodological way how St. Augustine considers it. That is to say, instead of adopting a biological-psychological and theoretical attitude, St. Augustine considers sensual lust “according to the characteristics of how he has factically experienced it and still experiences it—that is, how and when he encounters it” (Heidegger 2004a: 157). St. Augustine encounters the sensual temptation through touching both in the daytime and at night, i.e. both while he is awake and while asleep. He discovers that facing the sensual temptation, he is able to resist it while he is awake, but he falls for the temptation while he is asleep and dreaming. These two different situations make him uncertain whether there is a different ‘I am’ in different situations, or whether the ‘I am’ in sleeping and dreaming is not ‘I am’. For even in the case that I fell prey to the temptation in dreaming, when I wake up, I

return to peace of conscience discovering I did not do it. There is something I did not do (I did not enact it), and yet it occurs and proceeds with me and in me. As Heidegger notes, “this uncovers: ‘facticity’.” (Heidegger 2004a: 158) With regard to our being (‘I am’), there is “something that we ‘are’ ourselves and yet, that we are not” (Heidegger 2004a: 158). Though St. Augustine discusses the sensual temptation in terms of these two states (awake, asleep), Heidegger emphasizes: “One has to leave aside all theoretically formulated divisions like body and soul, sensuality and reason, body and mind, and so forth.” (Heidegger 2004a: 158) This means that, conversely, “it is necessary not to take the experiences, and experiences of dreams, as ‘occurrences,’ [*Vorgänge*] but to take them in their full factual How, in which I have the world and my life and in which I am.” (Heidegger 2004a: 158) These different states (awake, asleep) must be taken as factual situations in which I behave (comport myself) differently. Hence, insofar as temptation emerges from my enactmental behavior (comportment), i.e. from my various ways of having my world and my life, its meaning must be sought from this aspect. Furthermore, although Heidegger does not explicitly indicate how this sensual temptation brings me in danger (defluxion), we may find some clue from St. Augustine’s prayer with regard to this temptation:

Lord, you will increase your gifts in me more and more, rescuing my soul from the honey-trap of concupiscence so that it will follow me to you and not be in conflict with itself: so that not even in its dreams will it carry out—or even consent to—the disgusting corruptions that arise from bestial images and pollute the flesh. (Augustine 2019: 185) (*Confessions* X 30.42)

St. Augustine prays for God's Grace to prevent his occasionally surrendering to the temptation in dreaming, from 'polluting' him, such that he might give in to the temptation as well while he is awake. The danger of this temptation lies in that even if this temptation takes over me from time to time only in my dreams, it still influences me in a way that it might eventually result in my actual surrender while I am awake. My everyday dealing or coping with things could be corrupted by the temptation, such that my care in the world loses its authenticity. As Heidegger comments, "The tempting or the being-tempted is an experiencing in which an experiential direction ... *tempts* ... in such a way that the authentic *cura* [concern] is lost in this." (Heidegger 2004a: 190)

As to the gustation, there is a competition or a tension between need and pleasure. I need to eat and drink to sustain my corruptible body, so that I carry with myself a necessity which indicates the bodily need. The need to consume food and drink to sustain my life demands a passage "from the discomfort of craving to the satisfaction of fullness" (Augustine 2019: 186) (*Confessions* X 31.44), which passage in turn is a pleasure. Insofar as "there is no other way to pass through it [and] there is only the path along which necessity compels us" (Augustine 2019: 186) (*Confessions* X 31.44), and the passage itself is a pleasure, I turn the necessity which indicates the bodily need into a pleasure, such that "this [necessity] is sweet to me" (Augustine 2019: 186) (*Confessions* X 31.43). As a result, there lies an insidious trap (cf. 'danger' supra.) of desire in the said passage. This trap is the possibility of weighing the pleasure over the necessary need. Notice that they don't have the same measure, "for what is enough for health is too little for delight" (Heidegger 2004a: 160). Heidegger remarks, "there is uncertainty [*Unsicherheit*] whether the necessary concern of the body seeks sustenance, or whether the deceptive desire for pleasure demands service."

(Heidegger 2004a: 160) Standing in this uncertainty, I have not yet made a decision whether I shall consume food and drink out of bodily need or merely for the sake of pleasure. This uncertainty is a possibility that constitutes my facticity, in which “I maintain myself and give [myself] ‘existence’ ”(Heidegger 2004a: 160). It is in this uncertainty that I actualize my possibility and enact the ‘how’ of my concrete daily dealing-with (*Umgehen mit*). It is precisely from this uncertainty that temptation emerges, such that “I struggle every day against the desire of eating and drinking” (Heidegger 2004a: 160).

Speaking of olfaction, St. Augustine confesses, “I am not overly concerned about them. I do not seek them out if they are absent; I do not spurn them if they are present; I am always ready to do without them.”(Augustine 2019, 188) (*Confessions* X 32.48) It seems as if the allurement of smell could not get to St. Augustine so that he would have to labor with it. But then St. Augustine continues, “it seems to me—perhaps I am mistaken about this.”(Augustine 2019, 188) (*Confessions* X 32.48) Although I view myself as immune to the allurement now, I am still not sure whether I could still resist the allurement at the next moment. My knowledge about myself might be mistaken; it could be deceived and deceiving. As Heidegger remarks, “there is the deplorable darkness in which the faculty which is in me is hidden from me: ... often it is concealed.” (Heidegger 2004a: 161) That is to say, my faculty of inquiring into my capacity is in the darkness; my knowledge of myself is insecure. Although at first sight I see myself as capable of resisting the allurement of smell now, I might well submit myself to it at the next moment. Heidegger comments, “the next moment can make me fall, and expose me as someone entirely different.”(Heidegger 2004a: 161) There is a double uncertainty here: my capacity of continuously resisting the allurement is uncertain, and

my knowledge concerning my capacity is also uncertain. My life, as well as my knowledge of myself, is in darkness, i.e. it is uncertain. This uncertainty itself is not to be understood as a form of temptation or danger, but the temptation (the allurements of smell in this case) reveals the uncertainty in me where there lies a danger: I might at some point give in to the allurements of smell. This is the situation in which I am: “anyone who could be made better from worse could also be made worse from the better.” (Heidegger 2004a: 161) Heidegger explains this situation, this uncertainty: “The ‘*fieri potuit*’—the past, what became possible and what I am in this having-become [*Gewordensein*—stands in a ‘*fiat*’ ” (Heidegger 2004a: 161). My ‘am’ in the ‘having-become’ is itself a ‘*fiat*’. This ‘*fiat*’ amounts, as Heidegger comments in a footnote, to an ‘it can’ (Heidegger 2004a: 161). It is “the becoming which could still occur” (Heidegger 2004a: 161). My life situation (status of existence) *now*, which bears in itself my ‘having-become’ *in the past*, is permeated by ‘it can’, by the ‘still occurring becoming’. My being as ‘having-become’ is constantly ‘becoming’; or to put it in the terminology in *Being and Time*, my being as “making-present-in-having-been” (*gewesend Gegenwärtigen*) is “potentiality-for-being” (*Seinkönnen*).

The uncertainty I discover in the face of the allurements is itself at the same time a possibility: a possibility that I might possess an inauthentic knowledge of myself, and that I could give in (or not give in) to the allurements. The temptation (the allurements of smell in this case) reveals my life as uncertainty, i.e. the possibility of ‘it can’, such that “No one should be secure in this life, which is called a total temptation (Job. VII, 1)” (Heidegger 2004a: 161).

Concerning audition, especially in the case of musical or religious

performances, St. Augustine holds that there exists a mysterious association between our diverse affects of spirit, sounds and chants. Due to this association, sounds and chants can stir up various affects of spirit in us. Insofar as sounds and chants can trigger a delight, “life in *affectus spiritus* [the affects of the spirit] will always ... stand in the uncertainty of its factual enactment.” (Heidegger 2004a: 162) This uncertainty is quite similar to that in gustation. There is always a danger, a temptation, that I seek sounds and chants merely for the pleasure they bring. Either the sound of chants gets prevalent status over its accompanied words of prayer such that I fall into the beautiful music agreeable to hearing and listening, deviating from the meaning of prayer, thus from relating myself to God through prayer. Or I remain merely within my pleasure instead of enjoying God in the beauty of the beautiful performance. Standing in uncertainty, I perform the function of hearing. My enactment of hearing could be “at the service of, in view of, holding itself in the ordering-toward—the *summum bonum* [greatest good]” (Heidegger 2004a: 162), or it could be purely for my own pleasure.

As to the sight (vision), the temptation that St. Augustine discusses takes place as follows. My eyes “love beautiful forms in all their variety, bright and pleasant colors” (Augustine 2019: 190) (*Confessions* X 34.51). The pleasures of sight affect me such that my eyes focus on the corporeal light which shines in beautiful things, instead of the true Light, Who endows me with authentic sight. Furthermore, to add the delight of eyes, artists and craftsmen produce numberless arts and manufactures “far beyond what is needed for use, restrained within reasonable bounds, and expressive of some devout meaning” (Augustine 2019: 191) (*Confessions* X 34.53). They fall into that which they make, and forsake the Source of beauty, Who creates all those beautiful things. They discover the beautiful forms and the norm from the Source of beauty, but they do not draw from

there the manner of using beautiful things. In the description of the temptation of sight, St. Augustine mentions “the pleasure of the eyes of this flesh” (Augustine 2019: 190) (*Confessions* X 34.51). For Heidegger, ‘flesh’ is not to be understood biologically as if what St. Augustine says here refers merely to seeing as a biological functionality. Rather, seeing reflects “a ‘how’ of *dealing-with* [*Umgehen mit*]” (Heidegger 2004a: 162). Accordingly, ‘flesh’ is to be understood with respect to this ‘how’ of our dealing-with. ‘In the flesh’ (*in carne*) refers to a specific ‘how’ of dealing-with, which for Heidegger means “in an orientation that is separated, non-divine, non-spiritual, and not concerned existentially [*existenziell*], not authentically [*eigentlich*] concerned, in a self-worldly manner, for the *beata vita*” (Heidegger 2004a: 162). Thus ‘seeing in the flesh’ means to perform the function of eyes in such a way that I deal with what I see in a non-spiritual, inauthentic and self-worldly manner, merely for my own pleasure. There is an uncertainty whether my seeing is towards the source of beauty or for my own pleasure.

B. The Second Form of Tentatio: Concupiscentia Oculorum

The second form of temptation is *concupiscentia oculorum*, desire of the eyes. How does it differ from the first form of temptation (*concupiscentia carnis*, desire of the flesh), and specifically from the temptation of sight? According to Heidegger’s reading of St. Augustine, in the first form of temptation, the desire is directed toward the delight which is real in all the various senses. It is a “lust of entertainment *in the flesh*” (*cupiditas se oblectandi in carne*) (Heidegger 2004a: 166). But in the second form of temptation, the lust is “an experiencing *through* the flesh” (*experiendi per carnem*) (Heidegger 2004a: 166). The desire in the second form of temptation aims not at the pleasure of senses, but at experiencing of oneself

(subjective genitive) through the senses. It does not strive for entertaining bodily senses, but using them in order to experience. Thus, while the desire in the first form of temptation seeks only what brings pleasure to bodily senses (i.e. beautiful, melodious, fragrant, savory, soft things), the desire in the second case pursues whatever provides opportunity for experiencing, even if it brings discomfort to bodily senses. As Blumenberg points out, the desire in the second form of temptation distinguishes itself from the first form “by its indifference to the qualities of the beautiful and the pleasant, since it ‘enjoys’ not its objects as such but rather *itself*” (Blumenberg 1999: 312). The desire in the second form enjoys not the object of five bodily senses but the mere executing of senses. It seeks self-enjoyment and is thus a lust at oneself. Notice that Heidegger distinguishes three directions (content-sense, relational sense and enactment-sense) with regard to phenomena (Heidegger 2004b: 43). The desire in the first form of temptation looks for something that pleases the bodily senses; it strives for “dealing with the content of what becomes accessible at the moment through the senses themselves” (Heidegger 2004a: 166). What is at stake is the content-sense of that which brings delight to bodily senses. But the desire in the second form of temptation, on the other hand, seeks experiencing itself instead of the content of experience. It puts aside the objects of bodily senses and focuses on the performance of five senses (seeing, hearing, smelling tasting and touching). As Heidegger remarks, “what is crucial is not really the content but the ‘relation,’ and indeed the mere enactment of the relation as such.” (Heidegger 2004a: 167) Rather than content-sense, the enactment-sense is dominant here.

In order to see more clearly which danger the second form of temptation creates, it is worth discussing here the distinction St. Augustine draws between ‘usefulness’ (*uti*) and ‘enjoyment’ (*frui*). For St. Augustine,

to enjoy a thing is “to rest with satisfaction in it for its own sake”, while to use it is to “to employ whatever means are at one’s disposal to obtain what one desires” (Augustine 1993, 523) (*De doctrina christiana* I 4, 4). Among those things, only “eternal and unchangeable” things are “true objects of enjoyments”; other things are for use (Augustine 1993, 527) (*De doctrina christiana* I 22, 20). In fact, the true objects of enjoyment are “the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, who are at the same time the Trinity” (Augustine 1993, 524) (*De doctrina christiana* I 5, 5). With regard to St. Augustine’s distinction of *uti* and *frui*, Heidegger noted, “Only the *trinitas* [trinity] must be held in enjoyment, that is *the highest and unchangeable good*”, and “[t]he appropriate comportment to the other things is *uti*” (Heidegger 2004a: 204). Only God can be the genuine object of enjoyment (*fruitio*). All other things of creation are to be used for the sake of the enjoyment of God. Blumenberg comments on St. Augustine’s view:

He sees the basic character of the world in its *utilitas* [usefulness] as the instrumentality *ad salutem* [for salvation] whereas a fulfilled and fulfilling existential relation is only to be expected from the *fruitio* [enjoyment, delight] directed at God. (Blumenberg 1999: 313)

It is to be noted that there is delight in all various bodily senses in relation to their objects. The objects of senses or the enactment of the senses (seeing, hearing, ...) can be delight. There is nothing wrong with this delight. But this delight must be authentically used (*utilitas*) for the sake of the enjoyment of the ultimate highest good, which is God. If the objects of senses and the sensible enactment become mere objects of delight and are not used for the sake of God, namely, if what is supposed to be used becomes the mere enjoyment in itself, then this is perversion (or fallenness).

As Blumenberg remarks, “The ordering principle of human life, which can be spelled out in the form of the ethical virtues, is fixed in the maxim that one should correctly distinguish between the usefulness and the enjoyment of things.” (Blumenberg 1999: 313) Perverting the distinction of *uti* and *frui* constitutes the violation of the ordering principle of human life, which amounts to ethical vice. The danger that the second form of temptation brings lies in this: while pursuing the mere performance of bodily senses, we take the sensible enactment as the mere object of enjoyment instead of the means to the ultimate genuine enjoyment. We put aside God, the genuine object of enjoyment, and seek only self-enjoyment. Likewise, the first form of temptation brings the danger of making the sensible objects, the created things that are supposed to be used for the sake of enjoyment in God (the Creator), as the mere object of enjoyment. Both forms of temptation constitute the danger of perverting *uti* and *frui*.

Back to our discussion concerning the second form of temptation. As Heidegger points out, St. Augustine calls this temptation “the superfluous curiosity of knowing” (*curiositas supervacanea cognoscendi*) (Heidegger 2004a: 165). As curiosity, it is “the greedy desire for the new” (Heidegger 2004a: 166). This desire always labors with the new experience, only for the sake of the new. It is the appetite of knowing “of the experience that takes cognizance of, and gets to know, something” (Heidegger 2004a: 166). The aim of this desire is the experiencing and knowing, merely for the sake of experiencing and knowing. It can be defined, Blumenberg remarks, as “the futile and inquisitive appetite for sensual experience (*experiendi per carnem vana et curiosa cupiditas*)” (Blumenberg 1999: 312). To facilitate this curious desire to know in experiencing, we even “put God to the test, demanding signs and wonders not for the sake of salvation, but out of the sheer desire for experience” (Augustine 2019, 193) (*Confessions* X 35.55).

As Heidegger comments, “God has to endure becoming a factor in human experiments. He has to respond to an inquisitive, pompous, and pseudo-prophetic curiosity.” (Heidegger 2004a: 167) Consequently, rather than as the ultimate object of enjoyment, God becomes the means used by humans for the sake of the enjoyment in mere experiencing. Blumenberg thus remarks that “it [i.e. curiosity] subjects even God to the criterion of *utilitas*, so as to be able to seek *fruitio* in the human self alone” (Blumenberg 1999: 313). According to Heidegger, insofar as this desire strives for fulfilling one’s own curiosity, it does not concern “dealing-with” (*Umgehen mit*, as in the first form of temptation: dealing with the objects of bodily senses), but only “looking-about-oneself” (*Sichumsehen*) (Heidegger 2004a: 166).

In what sense is this desire called ‘*concupiscentia oculorum* (desire of the eyes)’? St. Augustine points out that when we use our senses merely for the acquisition of knowledge, we say, “See how bright it is”, “See how it sounds”, “See what it smells like”, “See how it tastes”, “See how hard it is”. (Augustine 2019: 192) (*Confessions* X 35.54) Insofar as the function of seeing, in which the eyes have the principal role, is applied analogically as we acquire knowledge through our senses, the desire on the second form of temptation is designated as ‘desire of the eyes’.

C. The Third Form of *Tentatio*: *Ambitio Saeculi*

The third form of temptation is *ambitio saeculi*, secular ambition. With regard to St. Augustine’s reflection on this form of temptation, Heidegger indicates two elements: “*timeri et amari velle ab hominibus*” (wishing to be feared and loved by men), and St. Augustine’s view of human language as “*quotidiana fornax nostra (horum tentationum)* [our daily furnace (the tempting hour)]” (Heidegger 2004a: 171). These two elements refer, as Heidegger comments, to “the communal-worldly context

of experience” (*mitweltliche Erfahrungszusammenhang*) (Heidegger 2004a: 171). *Ambitio saeculi* concerns gaining a certain position or organizing one’s life such that one is feared or loved by others. While one considers oneself as the superior one in wanting to be feared, one views oneself as the valuable one in wanting to be loved. Both wanting to be feared and wanting to be loved are, as Heidegger points out, “motivated by cowardly weakness and insecurity, the dependence upon models, a need of being allowed to go along, or by the concealing prevention, and pushing away, of confrontation.” (Heidegger 2004a: 171) In order to avoid confrontation by making oneself be feared or loved by others, one might fall in the danger of hiding oneself and playacting such that one presents oneself as important. Consequently, as Heidegger comments, “In giving in to this *tentatio*, the self is lost for itself in its ownmost way.” (Heidegger 2004a: 171)

Human language becomes the locus or the moment of temptation. The opinions, claims and judgments of others are crucial for our being feared or loved by them. Hence, speaking, communicating oneself and hearing all become decisive in constituting how one experiences communal-worldly. Thus, language, as Heidegger remarks, “leads the communal-worldly context of experience back to the decisive manner of the enactment of communal-worldly experiencing.” (Heidegger 2004a: 171) The danger of the third form of temptation, therefore, lies in that the communal world is merely determined by human language, which can be fickle, inauthentic or even deceitful.

Insofar as the desire in the third form of temptation strives for being feared or loved by others, love of God and fear of God cease to be decisively important. This brings the danger of making effort, as Heidegger indicates, with regard to “how they think of us”, and “how and as what we

are held in validation by them” (Heidegger 2004a: 174). As a result, one prefers the deceitful truth of human beings to the genuine truth of God.

In making oneself be feared or loved by others, the self is exalted in the communal-worldly situation. The self-world is posited into the foreground and gets emphasized. In fact, the self-validation (*Selbstgeltung*) in the communal-worldly factual experiencing is becoming a most central desire. As Heidegger states, “The desire to validate oneself is motivated, and maintained in its enactment, by a certain *self-importance* [*Selbstwichtignahme*].” (Heidegger 2004a: 173) This taking oneself to be important constantly engages in the bustling activity for the sake of gaining praise. But the truth of human being is that, as Heidegger noted, “He has nothing which he could ever bring forth as deserving of praise, and if he does have it, he has received it.” (Heidegger 2004a: 175) All that which is worth being praised in human being comes from God; it is a gift of God. Hence, St. Augustine states that “the one who offers praise is better than the one who receives it” (Augustine 2019: 195) (*Confessions* X 36.59). For the one who offer praise finds delight in God’s gift, while the one who is praised has more delight in being praised than in having the gift from God. The one who finds delight in being praised takes oneself to be more important than God. One’s own self-world is presented to oneself in such a way that, in Heidegger’s opinion, one can “explicitly take oneself to be important in one’s presented self-world” (Heidegger 2004a: 178). This results in four possibilities of danger, which Heidegger singles out from St. Augustine’s reflection (Heidegger 2004a: 178-179).

First of all, one takes what one has done or what one does as important, even if it cannot really be reckoned as a genuine good. Thus, one risks marking a non-good a good. Instead of the general ‘what’ of objective properties, the ‘how’ of I am (e.g. how I view things) becomes the criterion

of the good. Secondly, even if one has a genuine insight in judging what is good, one could take what is good about oneself as “having been given to the self by itself” (Heidegger 2004a: 179). In this case, one takes the genuine good as “self-appropriated” rather than as a gift from God (Heidegger 2004a: 179). As such, one ventures on elevating oneself to an inappropriate position. Thirdly, even if one recognizes the good as a gift from God and not as self-appropriated, one might still take oneself as important to the extent that one elevates oneself to the position to be worthy of the gift. Finally, even if one does not view oneself as worthy of God’s gift and admits to possessing the good without deserving it, one might nonetheless find no joy in sharing the good with others. One could have “this undeserved good enviously for oneself, keeping it locked up and not wishing it for others” (Heidegger 2004a: 179). By giving-in to the possibilities of danger that *ambitio saeculi* creates, the self-world gets so emphasized that it not only becomes dominant in the communal world, but itself even becomes the communal world. Heidegger contends, “Precisely in this ‘worldly’ positioning [*Ansetzung*—holding before oneself [*Vorhalt*—the self is lost.” (Heidegger 2004a: 179) In taking oneself to be important such that the self-world gets posited exclusively as one’s communal world, one loses one’s self in it.

D. The How of the Being of Human Revealed by Temptation

After exploring Heidegger’s interpretation of St. Augustine’s presentation on temptation, we may discover that Heidegger puts his focus on the way the being of man gets revealed by temptation. Temptation, especially the first form of temptation (*concupiscentia carnis*), reveals the uncertainty within me. This uncertainty is not an epistemological term, as if it could be an element of a philosophy of objectivated knowledge, as is actually the case in Descartes’ forms of doubt (cf. 1st Meditation). Rather,

uncertainty is interpreted as an ontological term which reveals the how of the being of human.

The uncertainty revealed by *concupiscentia carnis* expresses that I am not certain yet in which direction I orient my life: whether I surrender to temptation or resist it. Being tempted does not amount to giving-in to temptation. This uncertainty indicates that I have not yet made a decision. I can take a different direction. Hence my being (I am) is possibility.⁶ I am also uncertain about my capacity of continuously resisting the temptation. That is, even if I resist the temptation at this moment, I am uncertain whether I could persist in this resistance at the next moment. My having resisted could become a surrendering. My being is a constant becoming. Thus, my being as possibility is a becoming having-been.

Temptation is a danger, indicating the deteriorated direction in which I might (possibility) orient my life (cf. *defluere*, defluxion). In the first form of temptation (*concupiscentia carnis*), my enactment of bodily senses could be directed merely toward my own pleasure in sensible objects, rather than making them at the service of searching God, the *summum bonum* (greatest good). As falling into the danger of *concupiscentia carnis*, I am absorbed in my dealing with sensible objects. The danger of the second temptation (*concupiscentia oculorum*) lies in the possibility of immersing oneself in the enactment of senses. Unlike *concupiscentia carnis*, in which the enactment of senses is dealing-with (*Umgehen mit*), the sensible enactment in *concupiscentia oculorum* becomes looking-about-oneself (*Sichumsehen*). With regard to *concupiscentia oculorum*, there is also a dangerously virulent possibility of making God at the service of the delight in the

⁶ While according to Heidegger's reading of St. Augustine, the being of men as being-possible is disclosed by confronting temptation, it is disclosed by anxiety in *Being and Time*.

sensible enactment. Finally, the danger of the third form of temptation (*ambitio saeculi*) is twofold. First, ‘how others think’ matters so much that I might let myself be determined by the opinions of others, and myself could consequently be dissolved in them. Second, I might elevate myself to a position where I become the judge, the giver and the sole legitimate owner of the good. As a result, my self-world is posited exclusively as my communal world. Now these three forms of temptation expressing particular modes of man’s being in danger, reveal the possible falling of my being: absorbing into the surrounding world as dealing-with, self-elevating in looking-about-oneself and dissolving in the self-worldly positing communal world. In any case, one’s self is lost as “*in multa defluere*” (scattered, dissolution into the many), which Heidegger understands as “dissolving into the manifold and [being] absorbed [*aufgehen*] in the dispersion” (Heidegger 2004a: 151-52).

Thus, temptation uncovers the being of man as the possibility which is constantly becoming having-been. As Heidegger remarks, “It [i.e. *tentatio*] has the possibilities of turning into the *defluxus* [flowing out, sliding down, scattering] and the *continentia* [continence].”⁷ (Heidegger 2004a, 205-6) Its deteriorated mode is revealed as dissolving and absorbing.

III. From Being-tempted to Being-sinful

In this last part of this paper, I intend to bring together the previous elucidations concerning Heidegger’s reading of Luther’s theology of sin and of St. Augustine on temptations. As I mentioned earlier, in his

⁷ Heidegger does not elaborate much on *continentia*. He understands it as “the mode and direction of the overcoming and the halting of the fall”. See Heidegger 2004a: 177. Here we are rather interested in the deteriorated mode of the being of men.

interpretation of St. Augustine on temptation, Heidegger concentrates on the how of the being of man revealed by temptation. The investigation into temptation paves the way for knowing the how of man's being, on the basis of which sin is to be realized. The how of the being of men, revealed by temptation, is the condition of possibility of being sinful. Within man's being occurs the falling transition from being-tempted to being-sinful.

In its being tempted, my being is revealed as uncertain. This uncertainty shows that my being is possibility, which expresses my being as potentiality-for-being (*Seinkönnen*). Standing in possibility, I orient my life. By surrendering to temptation, I orient my life in a deteriorated direction, which is pointed out by the danger of temptation, consisting of either 1) making sensible objects or sensible enactment to be mere objects of enjoyment rather than considering them as means for enjoyment in God, or 2) debasing God at the service of the delight in the sensible enactment, or 3) elevating oneself to be the judge, the giver and the sole legitimate owner of the good. Now if I give-in to temptation as in the first case, I transform what is properly only a means into mere objects of enjoyment. By doing so, I turn in a wicked way from the genuine object of enjoyment, which for St. Augustine is God, toward what is supposed to be merely used, and cling to the sensible objects. According to Heidegger's reading of Luther, turning away from God and clinging to worldly things together characterize man's being placed before God as being sinful. Next, if I yield myself to temptation as in the second case, I use God as means to the enjoyment in my sensible enactment. This amounts to reversing the proper *uti – frui* relation between my sensible enactment and God, and thus perverting the relation between I and God. This again is Luther's idea of sinning. Finally, God is the genuine judge, giver and owner of the good. If I submit myself to temptation as in the third case, I claim myself to be God

and God not to be God. This is what Luther describes as the essence of sin. Hence, given the state of being-tempted, if one correspondingly enacts one's life in a deteriorated direction (exemplified by the above three cases), one becomes sinful. Sin is realized through corruptly enacting what is attested to be possible (cf. *Seinkönnen*) within the state of being-tempted.

According to Heidegger, what is revealed by being-tempted, *Seinkönnen*, is a genuine research object of philosophy, as his analysis of Dasein in *Being and Time*. On the other hand, the concept of sin (being-sinful) is to be properly investigated in theology. Thus, if we question the relation between philosophy and theology, the investigation of the transition from being-tempted to being-sinful may shed some light on this issue. In so far as the enacting in a deteriorated direction is essential in this transition, a study concerning the enactment serves to bridge philosophy and theology. Now the aim of Heidegger's peculiar phenomenological method, formal indication (*formale Anzeige*), is at explicating phenomena in three directional senses while specifically emphasizing the enactment-sense (Heidegger 2004b: 42-45). Hence, further research on formal indication demonstrates how philosophy can be related to theology in the way Heidegger proposes in his 1927/28 lecture "Phenomenology and Theology".⁸ This further research, however, goes beyond the scope of this paper.

⁸ "Philosophy is the formally indicative ontological corrective of the ontic and, in particular, of the pre-Christian content of basic theological concepts." See Heidegger 2009b: 52.

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哲學與神學關聯的可能性： 海德格早期關於罪的探究

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摘要

關於罪這個議題，海德格從未出版過任何專門的著作。不過，他曾在布特曼 (Rudolf Bultmann) 的「保羅倫理學」研討班中發表過二個演講，主題是「路德論罪的問題」（1924 年），提出路德關於罪的概念的一些基本觀點。此外，與罪的主題相關的是，海德格在 1921 年夏季學期的講座「奧古斯丁與新柏拉圖主義」中，對於奧古斯丁在《懺悔錄》第十卷中如何談論誘惑的分析。

本文的目的並非討論海德格如何理解路德和奧古斯丁關於罪的看法，而是藉由檢視海德格對於路德和奧古斯丁的詮釋，我們可以發現，對於「誘惑」的理解，如何能聯繫、甚至有助於「罪」的理解。透過進一步的反省，這個發現指出哲學與神學關聯的可能性，儘管海德格堅決劃清二者的界線，並聲稱它們是死敵。

本文的第一部分提出海德格如何理解路德的罪觀。他指出，路德認為罪是背離上帝，扭曲人與上帝之間的關係，宣稱自己是上帝且上帝不是上帝。本文的第二部分處理海德格如何分析奧古斯丁對於三種形式誘惑的說明：肉身的欲望 (*concupiscentia carnis*)，眼睛的欲望 (*concupiscentia oculorum*) 和世俗的雄心 (*ambitio saeculi*)。本文最後反省這三種形式的誘惑如何導致罪。這一反省暗示了哲學與神學關聯的可能性。

關鍵詞：海德格、路德、奧古斯丁、罪、誘惑、哲學與神學